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TAX PROGRESSION UNDER COLLECTIVE WAGE 






We study the impact of tax policy on wage negotiations, workers’ effort, employment, output 
and welfare when workers’ effort is only imperfectly observable. We show that the different 
wage-setting motives – rent sharing and effort incentives – reinforce the effects of partial tax 
policy measures but not necessarily those of more fundamental tax reforms. Although a 
higher degree of tax progression always leads to wage moderation, the well-established result 
from the wage bargaining literature that a revenue-neutral increase in the degree of tax 
progression is good for employment does not carry over to the case with wage negotiations 
and imperfectly observable effort. While it remains true that introducing  tax progression 
increases employment and output, we cannot rule out negative effects from an increase in tax 
progression when tax progression is already very high. Welfare effects are ambiguous a priori 
but we derive sufficient conditions for welfare improving revenue-neutral increases in tax 
progression. 
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1. Introduction 
The result that tax progression leads to wage moderation and is good for employment has 
been derived for different assumptions about the wage-setting motives such as rent sharing in 
wage bargaining models (see, e.g., Holm and Koskela 1996, Koskela and Vilmunen 1996, 
Koskela and Schöb 1999). The results for efficiency wage models, where firms unilaterally 
decide upon both the wage rate and the employment level, are, however, still mixed. Wage 
moderation has a positive effect on labour demand but a negative effect on individual labour 
effort and thus workers’ productivity. Hoel (1990) was the first to analyze the overall effect of 
tax progression in such a framework by showing that a higher marginal income tax rate, 
which leaves the average tax level unchanged at the initial equilibrium wage rate, will 
decrease the gross wage and unemployment (see also Goerke 1999) but Fuest and Huber 
(1998) show that, for a rise in tax progression such that the tax burden per worker is the same 
in the old and new equilibrium, the result might be reversed.
1 
It is important to emphasize that the effect of tax progression, however, has not yet been 
analyzed in a uniform framework that combines these different wage-setting motives. So far, 
only very few papers have combined wage bargaining and effort considerations at all. Early 
contributions by Lindbeck and Snower (1991) and Sanfey (1993) do not provide a uniform 
answer to the question as to how far different wage-setting motives analyzed in efficiency 
wage and union bargaining models reinforce or weaken each other. Later, Bulkley and Myles 
(1996) show that with imperfect monitoring of workers’ effort, monopoly trade unions will 
set a higher wage than the pure efficiency wage set by the firms. This provides a higher bonus 
for non-shirking and results in a higher level of effort than we would observe in a competitive 
labor market. Garino and Martin (2000), on the other hand, show that efficiency wages offset 
                                                 
1 All these results do not carry over to models where workers differ in their productivity or when we allow for 
market entry. A tax reform that raises marginal tax rates at all income levels and increases (decreases) average 
taxes at high (low) income levels may lead to higher gross wages and unemployment (see Andersen and 
Rasmussen 1999). With free entry and exit of firms, Rasmussen (2002) shows that in the long run, changes in 
profits may imply that higher wage tax progressivity will negatively affect employment if the marginal tax rate 
is too high.   2
the cost of higher wages and induce firms to make more concessions in wage negotiations. 
Thus there is theoretical evidence that the different wage-setting motives reinforce each other. 
Within such a framework, Altenburg and Straub (1998) analyze variations of the benefit-
replacement ratio. They find that, in contrast to the standard result in both efficiency wage and 
union bargaining models, the effect of a higher reservation utility on wages, employment, and 
effort is ambiguous  when benefits are financed through lump-sum taxes. A higher 
replacement ratio may then reduce the wage rate and raise employment. A higher reservation 
utility of workers will induce firms to reduce their demand for effective labor. If, as a 
consequence, the labor share decreases, firms experience a higher relative reduction in profits 
from a wage increase. This explains why the wage may actually fall and – in the end – 
employment will rise. 
To our knowledge, only Garcia and Rios (2004) analyze the impact of taxes in this 
framework. They adopt the Altenburg and Straub (2002) model to analyze revenue-neutral tax 
reforms  only numerically. Their numerical calculations suggest that a revenue-neutral 
increase in the tax exemption that is financed by an increase in the wage tax increases 
employment. This indicates that the result by Koskela and Schöb (1999), according to which a 
revenue-neutral shift from payroll taxes to wage taxes raises employment when there is a 
higher tax exemption for the latter, also applies when effort is unobservable. Furthermore, 
they argue that it is better for employment in the case of constant fiscal revenues to 
compensate higher tax exemption through increases in wage taxes rather than payroll taxes. 
Since Garcia and Rios (2004) only provide numerical, rather than analytical, results, we first 
present an analytical framework to elaborate the way in which tax policy affects wage 
negotiations and employment when effort is only imperfectly observable and trade unions and 
firms negotiate on wages and then study the impact of a revenue-neutral increase in tax 
progression on wage formation, effort determination and employment.  
Our comparative statics analysis indicates that the standard results from the trade union 
literature must be modified in the case of imperfect monitoring of individual effort 
determination. In these standard models, tax policy only affects wages by altering the size of   3
the labor surplus. When both wage-setting motives are present, however, tax policy also 
affects the strength with which tax policy parameters affect the negotiated wage and 
employment. When effort is not observable, tax policy affects the wage elasticity of effort, 
which in turn affects the wage elasticity of labor demand. Since these elasticities alter the 
scope with which workers can attract labor rents, this constitutes an additional channel by 
which tax policy can influence the wage negotiation. As it turns out, this additional impact 
reinforces the effects of partial tax policy measures that we observe in the standard 
bargaining and efficiency models.  
In the second main part of the paper, we then analyze revenue-neutral tax reforms that 
change the degree of tax progression, and derive the qualitative effects such tax reforms have 
on the negotiated wage, individual effort, and aggregate employment. Table 1 highlights the 
importance of such an analysis. The labor tax systems in all the OECD countries are 
progressive and show significant differences in the degree of tax progression. We measure tax 
progression by the difference between marginal and average tax rates that are shown in the 
first and second columns.
2 This difference, reported in the third column, is known as the 
average wage tax progression ARP (see Lambert 2001, chapters 7 and 8 and our section 5). 
The higher this difference, the more progressive wage taxation is. The highest difference is 
for France, with 19.2 percentage points, and the lowest one for Canada, with only 1.4 
percentage points.  
                                                 
2   To make these figures comparable with our stylized model framework below, all tax rates are with reference 
to the gross wage, including payroll taxes paid by the employer.   4
Table 1: Labor taxation in the OECD countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 












Australia 28.6 35.4 6.8 22.9 
Austria 44.9 55.5 10.6 56.1 
Belgium 54.2 66.4 12.2 34.8 
Canada 32.3 33.9 1.6 26.4 
Czech Republic  43.6 48.1 4.5 34.9 
Denmark 41.5 49.2 7.7 20.7 
Finland 43.8 55.1 11.3 36.6 
France 47.4 66.6 19.2 30.3 
Germany 50.7 64.0 13.3 44.9 
Greece 34.9 44.2 9.3 95.2 
Hungary 45.8 54.7 8.9 52.3 
Iceland 29.7 40.4 10.7 30.7 
Ireland 23.8 33.2 9.4 49.5 
Italy 45.7 58.0 12.3 46.7 
Japan 26.6 31.5 4.9 47.8 
Korea 16.6 24.8 8.2 80.0 
Luxembourg 31.9 45.9 14.0 64.5 
Mexico 15.4 23.4 8.0 78.1 
Netherlands 43.6 50.7 7.1 56.6 
New Zealand 20.7 33.0 12.3 37.3 
Norway 36.9 43.2 6.3 25.4 
Poland 43.1 45.7 2.6 33.7 
Portugal 32.6 39.4 6.8 60.0 
Slovak Republic  42.0 48.3 6.3 52.1 
Spain 38.0 45.5 7.5 43.3 
Sweden 48.0 51.7 3.7 17.0 
Switzerland 28.8 36.5 7.7 46.7 
Turkey 42.7 44.5 1.8 12.5 
United Kingdom 31.2 40.6 9.4 35.1 
United States  29.6 34.1 4.5 22.5 
Source: OECD (2004)  
Legend: Tax rates are for the year 2004 for a single person with 100% of average wage, relative 
to the gross wage including the social security contributions paid by employees. Column (3) shows 
the difference between marginal and average rate of income tax. As an approximation it is 
assumed that for each country the tax schedule consists of a tax exemption and a constant 
marginal tax rate. The exchange rate between US dollar and euro was assumed to be unity. Social 
assistance level does not include housing costs. Numbers for social assistance are from 2002 and 
taken from OECD (2004), Benefits and Wages, OECD Indicators. 
Our first main result shows that an increase in wage tax progression always leads to wage 
moderation. In this respect, our model shows that the wage moderation effect of higher tax 
progression that is present in both the efficiency wage model and the bargaining model carries 
over to the more general case when both wage-setting motives are at work. The effect of 
higher tax-revenue neutral progression on effort and, consequently, on labor demand, 
however, is a priori ambiguous. Although it remains true that introducing tax progression 
raises employment, it turns out that the claim “tax progression is good for employment” 
(Koskela and Vilmunen 1996) only applies to moderate degrees of tax progression.   5
In section 2 below, we present the basic structure of the model and describe the time 
sequence of decisions with respect to wage bargaining, labor demand, and individual effort 
determination. The workers’ individual effort determination and the firms’ labor demand are 
elaborated in section 3. Section 4 uses the Nash bargaining approach to analyze wage 
negotiations subject to firms’ labor demand and workers’ effort determination and presents 
the essential comparative static results. Section 5 applies the analysis to revenue-neutral 
changes in the labor tax structure and explores the effects of tax progression on the negotiated 
wage, individual effort, and employment. The main findings are summarized in section 6. 
2. Basic  framework 
Concerning the time sequence of decisions, we assume that the government behaves as a 
Stackelberg leader who fixes the tax parameters in the first stage. To raise revenues, the 
government can employ a wage tax t, which is levied on the gross wage w minus a tax 
exemption  a. Thus the tax base for the wage tax t equals  L a w ) ( − , where L denotes total 
employment. In the presence of a positive tax exemption a, the marginal tax rate t exceeds the 
average tax rate  ) 1 ( w a t t
a − ≡  so that we have a linearly progressive tax system, with 
progression depending positively on the wage rate. The net-of-tax wage workers receive is 
given by  ta w t w
n + − = ) 1 ( . We abstract away from payroll taxes. 
At stage 2, firms and trade unions bargain with respect to the gross wage.
3 They take the 
tax parameters as given and anticipate the consequences that the negotiated gross wage has 
for labor demand by firms and also that the resulting net labor income has for individual effort 
determination by workers. After the wage negotiations are settled, at stage 3 the firms decide 
about their labor demand. Since firms cannot perfectly observe effort, the firms have to 
anticipate the workers’ individual effort decisions. At the final stage, stage 4, workers make 
their individual effort choice. The time sequence of decisions is summarized in Figure 1. In 
                                                 
3   Since tax parameters are given from the viewpoint of firms and trade unions, it does not matter whether they 
bargain over gross or net-of-tax wages (see Koskela and Schöb 2002).   6
the subsequent sections we derive the decisions taking place at different stages by using 
backward induction. 
Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions 
1 s t a g e
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Tax policy
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2 s t a g e
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3. Individual effort determination and labor demand 
We start by analyzing the 4
th stage, where workers decide about their working effort, taking 
the tax policy, the negotiated wage, and aggregate employment as given. Then we analyze 
stage 3, where firms determine employment. 
3.1.   Individual effort determination 
We focus on the choice that a single worker faces when employed by a representative firm in 
a static framework. Since effort cannot be fully controlled by firms, they can set a standard 
effort that we normalize to one. If workers meet this standard, their jobs are secure. If they 
shirk by providing less effort, however, firms can fire them. The employment probability can 
thus be described by a minimum function. For effort lower than the standard we assume, for 
analytical convenience, an iso-elastic probability function of employment 
d e  where  0 > d  
denotes the (constant) employment probability elasticity of effort.
4 The employment 
probability rises with effort for  1 < e  and is 1 for higher effort level so that we have the 
employment probability function  ) , 1 min(
d e ≡ ρ  and the probability of being laid off is 
) , 1 min( 1
d e − . The parameter d is increasing in both monitoring intensity and monitoring 
                                                 
4   We exclude the case where d = 0 because in this case, the job would be secure even without providing effort 
and total output would fall to zero. This would lead firms to set a wage rate equal to zero. Both employment 
supply and demand would then be indetermined. Futhermore, note that if the detection probability should be 
concave in effort, we would have to assume  1 ≤ d .   7
efficiency. Low values of d makes it less risky for workers to shirk while  +∞ → d  implies 
perfect monitoring and the firing of all workers who do not meet the working effort standard.  
Imperfect monitoring implies that when assuming a representative risk-neutral worker 
and applying a specific utility function V  that is additively separable and quasi-linear, we 
obtain 
(1)  ( )b e e g w e V
d n d w ) , 1 min( 1 )] ( )[ , 1 min( − + − = , 
where b  denotes the workers’ outside option, which equals some exogenous unemployment 
income, and  ) (e g  denotes the disutility of effort e as a convex function, i.e. 
0 ) ( ' ' , 0 ) ( ' > > e g e g .
5 Working time per worker is assumed to be fixed and normalized to 
unity. 
For the following, it is convenient to define the workers’ surplus as the difference 
b e g w s
n − − ≡ ) ( . This allows us to rewrite the utility function as  b s e V
d w + = , which splits 
the utility into the expected surplus when working with effort e and the basic income b , 
which the household receives in any case. The optimal individual effort level can be derived 
from the first-order condition  0 ) ( '
1 = − =
− e g e s de V
d d w
e . The worker chooses an effort level at 
which the expected utility loss of working harder, which occurs with probability 
d e , equals 
the expected utility gain from an increased probability of staying in employment and 
receiving the surplus s. Using the parameterization  1 , / ) ( > θ θ =
θ e e g , the effort function 
becomes: 
(2)  () () θ θ θ
θ















n n . 
It is straightforward to show that individual effort is increasing in the net-of-tax wage rate, 
and decreasing in the outside option. This implies that we have  0 < t e , because this lowers the 
net-of-tax wage and thus reduces the penalty when caught shirking. Accordingly, we observe 
                                                 
5   In what follows, the derivatives of functions with one variable will be denoted by using primes, while partial 
derivatives will be denoted by subscripts indicating what variable we are differentiating with respect to.   8





− = , a property we will employ later on. The 














The respective partial derivatives with respect to the outside option b, the tax exemption a, 















































−a b . 
The partial derivatives (4) and (5) depend on the effects the respective parameters have on the 
net-of-tax wage relative to the income surplus of working. With respect to an increase in the 
tax rate, this effect is ambiguous since a rise in the wage tax lowers  ) 1 ( t w −  but at the same 
time raises the effective tax credit ta. A higher tax rate always increases the difference 
between the net-of-tax rate in absolute terms, but it may lower the relative difference, which is 
decisive for the elasticity if the tax exemption a is very generous. If  a b = , the wage elasticity 
of effort is unaffected by t since in this case we have  ) )( 1 ( ) ( b w t b w
n − − = − . A higher tax 
exemption a implies that a wage rate increase has a lower relative impact on the net-of-tax 
wage and thus implies a lower wage elasticity of effort. Only if  a b > , a rise in the tax rate 
increases the impact a rise in the wage rate has on effort: the higher t is, the stronger the 
relative increase of  b w
n −  due to a wage increase is and thus the stronger the relative effect 
on individual effort. 
The direct effect of a change in the tax exemption is unambiguous. An increase in the tax 
exemption implies that a marginal wage increase now has a lower relative impact.   9
3.2. Labor demand 
In the 3
rd stage of the game, each firm takes the tax parameters and the negotiated wage as 
given and decides about the labor demand L by taking into account how the representative 
worker will adjust effort. To derive an explicit solution, we postulate a decreasing returns-to-









) ( eL eL f ,    1 > δ . 
Profit is given by  wL eL f − = π ) ( . Since firms anticipate the effort level, workers will provide 
(0 = e V ), and the first order profit maximization condition is  w e eL f L − = = π ) ( ' 0 . Using this 
specification, we obtain the following labor demand function: 
(7) 
1 − δ δ − = e w L . 
The partial derivative of labor demand with respect to the tax parameters and the negotiated 
wage rate are as follows:  0 ) 1 (
1 < − δ =
− e e L L t t , 0 ) 1 (
1 > − δ =
− e e L L a a , 
0 ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 (
1 2 1 ) 1 ( < δ + δ − ε − = − δ + δ − =
− − δ δ − − δ − δ − w L e e w e w L w w  .Since the wage tax and the tax 
exemption are levied on workers, they only affect labor demand via the workers’ individual 
effort, which depends on the net-of-tax wage rate. The wage rate w affects labor demand in 
two different ways. Note that the standard assumption that profit decreases with increases in 
the wage rate implies that the wage elasticity of effort is smaller than one, i.e.  1 < ε . For the 
concave production function (6), the wage elasticity of labor demand depends on both the 
technological parameter δ  and the wage elasticity of individual effort ε as defined in (3): 
(8)  δ + δ − ε = δ ≡ − ) 1 (
*
L
w Lw . 
The wage elasticity of labor demand is lower compared to the case where wages do not affect 
effort. It now depends negatively on the wage elasticity of effort. For  1 0 < ε ≤  we have 
δ ≤ δ <
* 1 . Hence, in the presence of unobservable individual effort determination the wage 
elasticity of labor demand depends on the tax structure and thus tax policy levied on workers.   10
If, for instance, a tax reform increases the wage elasticity of effort, labor demand would 
become less elastic. A wage rise would then be less costly for a trade union since the firm 
would then lay off fewer workers. 
The firm’s indirect profit function, which we will use in the next section, can be obtained 
by inserting labor demand (7) into the profit function  wL eL f − = π ) ( :  
(9) 
) 1 (




= − = π
− δ δ −
− δ δ − δ δ − e w
e w e w f e w . 
Having analyzed workers’ and firms’ behavior with respect to effort and labor demand, we 
can now turn to the collective wage bargaining of stage 2. 
4.  Collective wage bargaining 
To derive the negotiated wage, we apply the Nash bargaining solution within a ‘right-to-
manage’ model according to which employment is unilaterally determined by the firms. The 
wage bargaining takes place in anticipation of the optimal employment decision by the firms 
and the optimal individual effort decision by workers (2).
6 
The trade union maximizes the sum of the workers utility 
w V , and the utility of the 
unemployed. Since those caught shirking and fired are replaced by unemployed workers, the 
expected utility of an unemployed worker is (for inner solutions with  1 < ρ ): 
(10)  )) ( ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1
















− − = . 
While we assume that a single worker who is caught shirking will become and remain 
unemployed as well as receive b , from the viewpoint of the trade union, an unemployed 
member will replace a laid-off worker with the lay-off probability, which is 
d e − 1  times the 
                                                 
6   Bulkley and Myles (1997) have analyzed the generalized Nash bargain between a trade union and a firm 
over employment level and effort level and showed that higher union power will lead to a reduction in the 
agreed effort level. But they do not study the impact of labor taxes on employment and effort levels.    11
employment share. We can rewrite the linear utilitarian objective function of the trade union 
as  
(11)  N b L e s L N V L V U
u w + = − + =
* *) ( ) ( ˆ , 
where the first term captures the workers’ surplus from employment and the second term 
captures the exogenously given minimum income for all N members. 
* L  denotes optimal 
employment and 
* e  optimal effort in the s term. We denote the relative bargaining power of 
the union by β, and that of the firm by  ) 1 ( β − , and assume that the threat points of the trade 
union and the firm are described by  Nb U =
0  and  0
0 = π , respectively. Applying the Nash 
bargaining solution, the negotiating parties decide on the wage w in order to solve  
(12)  {
β − βπ = Ω
1 *
) (
) ( U w Max
w
,  s.t.  0 = π = L e V ,  
where 
* * 0 ) ( ˆ L e s U U U = − =  is the bargaining surplus to the trade union by including the 
disutility of effort and 
* π  is the indirect profit, presented in equation (9). The Nash bargaining 
solution satisfies the following first-order condition: 










As shown in appendix A, we can solve the first-order condition (13) to find the following 
implicit Nash bargaining solution for the wage rate in the presence of individual effort 
determination: 
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1 1 ) 1 )( 1 (
) 1 )( 1 (
, 
where  1 > M  for  1 < ε . The negotiated gross wage rate depends on the exogenous income b  
when unemployed, the wage tax t and the tax exemption a. Furthermore, it also depends on 
the mark-up M that, apart from exogenous parameters, also depends on the wage elasticity of 
effort ε.   12
Before we analyze comparative statics of the general case (14), we will first briefly 
discuss several special cases, which can be analyzed within the framework we have developed 
here. 
A. Observable effort 
When effort is observable and verifiable, it can become part of the wage contract. If the 
contract specifies some fixed effort level e , we obtain the standard right-to-manage model of 
union bargaining, where the wage depends on the bargaining power of the trade union and the 
(constant) wage elasticity of labor demand in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
Since a constant individual effort e  implies  0 = ε  and a zero probability of being caught 
shirking, i.e.  1 = ρ , we have 
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. From (15a), we can easily derive the 
special cases of a monopoly union 
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and the competitive labor market outcome where unions have no bargaining power and the 
gross wage only compensates for the disutility of working 








= β = ε
t






in which case the firm exploits the complete workers’ surplus, i.e.  0 = s . 
Alternatively we can consider the case where worker can determine their effort 
unilaterally but the firm can observe the effort level. It could then pay a wage per unit of 
effective labor input eL. This requires a modification of (1) such that 
) ( ) 1 ( e g ta e t w V
w − + − = . Since the tax exemption does not affect the wage rate anymore, in 
this case the optimal effort is  [] 1
1
* ) 1 ( − θ − = t w e  and the effort elasticity  0 ) 1 /( 1 > − θ = ε  is   13
constant. The profit function becomes  weL eL f − = π ) (  with the firm maximizing with 
respect to eL . This gives the following wage elasticity of labor demand 
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The results are similar to the results by Hansen (1999, his case 2) who develops a model 
where workers can unilaterally determine their hours of work and where workers and firms 
then negotiate upon the hourly wage. The structure of the solution (15b) is qualitatively 
similar to that of (15a) in the sense that in both cases the mark-up is independent of tax 
instruments. 
B. Unobservable effort without bargaining 
When 0 = β , the firm unilaterally sets the wage. From the first-order condition  0
* = πw , it 
follows immediately that the firm acts according to the well-known Solow-condition (Solow 
1979), i.e. we have  1 = ε  and thus 



























w 1 1 1
0 . 
The model therefore also captures the essence of the efficiency models with a (constant) 
mark-up over the outside option. 
C. Unobservable effort with bargaining: comparative statics 
For the general case, we have  0 ) 1 ( > ε −  and the mark-up is larger than one when the trade 
union has some bargaining power, i.e.  0 > β . It increases with the relative bargaining power 
                                                 
7   A proof is available from the authors upon request.   14
of the trade union β, and depends negatively on the direct wage elasticity of labor demand δ . 
The wage rate now depends, in addition to the relative bargaining power, the wage elasticity 
of labor demand, the exogenous income, and the tax parameters, on the elasticity of effort 
determination ε. Furthermore, unlike in the case of observable effort, the exogenous income 
b  when unemployed, the wage tax rate t, and the tax exemption a will also affect the wage 
rate via the mark-up M .  
The impact of a better monitoring of workers on the negotiated wage is zero as the wage 
elasticity of effort is not affected by monitoring. We can thus focus on the comparative statics 
of the tax parameters and the outside option in what follows. 
The derivative of the mark-up with respect to ε is  0 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 1 > ε − − δ β =
− −
ε M . The mark-
up with respect to effort e is  0 = e M . Since condition (14) is an implicit function of w, we 
can derive the partial derivative with respect to, for example, a by taking the total derivative 
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1.  
By rearranging, we obtain 







































M w a a  
with  [ ] 0 ) 1 )( ( 1
1 > − − ε − ≡ Δ
−
ε t ta b M w . In the Nash bargaining solutions with observable effort 
(15a) and (15b), the mark-up is independent of a. With unobservable effort, however, 
workers will increase effort when the tax exemption rises. When workers have some 
bargaining power, i.e.  0 > β , this ceteris paribus lowers the mark-up because a lower wage 
elasticity of effort implies a higher wage elasticity of labor demand (see equation (8)). A 
higher wage then induces less effort, which makes the worker less productive. As a 
consequence more layoffs result from a wage increase.  
The effect of the wage tax rate can be expressed as    15
(18)  {{ 0
) 1 ( 1
1




































M w t t . 
The total effect of a higher wage tax rate on the negotiated wage is a priori ambiguous. When 
we assume  a b ≥ , both the effect on the mark-up and the effect on the total outside option 
with the given mark-up are unambiguously positive. 
Hence, tax parameters in our model with both Nash wage bargaining and individual effort 
determination affect both of these via a change in the difference between the net-of-tax wage 
income and the outside option as well as via a change in the mark-up.  
We summarize our new characterization of the negotiated wage under individual effort 
determination in 
Proposition 1:  Unobservable individual effort determination strengthens the 
partial effects tax policy measures have on the negotiated wage compared to the 
case where effort is observable. Decreasing the tax exemption lowers the 
negotiated wage, while an increase in the wage tax rate increases the negotiated 
wage under a sufficient but not necessary condition  a b ≥ . 
We can easily verify that the effects indeed reinforce each other. If we take the partial 
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M wt . 
For  a b ≥ , the effects tax parameter changes have on the negotiated wage when effort is 
observable are always reinforced when effort is not observable. The partial derivative of   16
equation (16) with respect to a shows the same result for the efficiency wage model: the 
different wage-setting motives thus reinforce the partial tax policy effects on gross wages. We 
should note, however, that in the case where  a b ≤  and  0 ) ( > − + a b e g  we would obtain 
opposite partial effects for changes in the wage tax rate. An increase in the wage tax will then 
increase the gross wage when effort is observable but will lower the gross wage when effort is 
unobservable.
8 
As we pointed out when discussing (15b), the reinforcing effect is also present in a model 
with endogenous effort determination. 
5.  The impact of a tax-revenue-neutral change in tax progression 
on wage formation, employment, effort, output, and welfare 
We are now ready to analyze what are the impacts a revenue-neutral restructuring of the labor 
tax, i.e. the degree of wage tax progression, on wage formation, individual effort 
determination, and employment. The effect of wage tax progression, which keeps the tax 
revenue  [] L a w t G ) ( − =  constant, can be written in the following way: 
[] dw L a w t tL tLda Ldt a w dG w ) ( ) ( 0 − + + − − = = . Recalling the definition of the average tax 
as  () w a t t


















An appropriate and intuitive way to define tax progression is to look at the average tax rate 
progression (ARP), which is given by the difference between the marginal tax rate t and the 
average tax rate t
a, 
a t t ARP − = . The tax system is progressive if ARP is positive, and tax 
progression is increased if the difference increases (at a given income level, see Lambert 
                                                 
8   We mentioned before that our model also allows us to capture the essence of a model where workers can 
endogenously determine working hours when working hours are observable, see the discussion of equation 
(15b). Interpreting our model as a model of imperfectly observable effective working hours we can i) 
confirm the results derived by Hansen (1999) for perfectly observable working hours and ii) also find the 
reinforcing effect when effective working hours cannot be perfectly monitored.   17
2001, chapters 7 and 8). The term 
* δ −
a t t  indicates the marginal tax revenue per worker 
when the gross wage increases. It can be decomposed in such a way that we have a tax 
progression effect and a tax level effect: ) 1 (
* δ − +
a t ARP . The total effect is non-positive for 
a linear tax system with  0 = ARP  since  0 ) 1 (
* ≤ δ − , but may eventually become positive if 
the tax system is sufficiently progressive since the employment effect is weighted by the 
average tax rate only. As we will see later on, the degree of tax progression is decisive for the 
way in which a revenue-neutral change in tax progression affects both employment and 
individual effort. 
5.1  Revenue-neutral tax progression and the negotiated wage 
The total effect of changes in the tax parameters t and a on the negotiated wage is 
(20)  da w dt w dw a t + = , 





















and, thus, the total effect of a revenue-neutral increase in the wage tax rate is  
(22)  1 *
0 ) ( 1
) (
−
















In what follows, we assume Laffer-efficiency in the sense that a higher wage tax increases tax 
revenues while a higher tax exemption leads to lower tax revenues even when we take 
account of the indirect effects via changes in w. With respect to the tax exemption, we then 
have 








− − = + − =
t
t t
w tL w G tL G
a
a a w a .   18
Substituting the partial derivatives  a w  from (17) and  t w  from (18) into the numerator of (22) 
shows that the numerator is unambiguously positive (see appendix B). Hence, we have the 
following:  
Proposition 2 (wage moderation): A revenue-neutral increase in wage tax 
progression will moderate the negotiated wage in the presence of individual effort 
determination. 
The interpretation is straightforward as it turns out that the numerator in equation (22) denotes 
the compensated effect an increase in the tax rate has on the wage, keeping the value of the 
Nash maximand constant (see appendix C). The revenue-neutral increase in the tax exemption 
fully offsets the income effect of the higher wage tax so that only the substitution effect of this 
progression-enhancing tax reform remains. This finding shows that the result from 
conventional ‘right-to-manage’ models in the absence of effort considerations (see, e.g., 
Koskela and Vilmunen 1996) also applies when we allow for unobservable individual effort 
determination.  
5.2  Revenue-neutral tax progression and individual effort determination 
The total effect of changes in the tax parameters t and a and the negotiated wage on effort 
determination is  dw e da e dt e de w a t + + = . Substituting the RHS of the tax-revenue neutrality 
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The direct effects of tax progression parameters on effort will cancel out so that it is only the 
induced wage-moderation that affects individual effort decisions. The term  t ea  measures the   19
impact one additional euro has on individual effort. A wage reduction of one euro reduces the 
net-of-tax wage by  ) 1 ( t −  so that effort falls by  t t ea ) 1 ( − . But wage-moderation also affects 
the amount by which the tax exemption can be raised. It will be lower than the neutral effect 
of raising a by  t a w ) ( −  if  0
* < δ −
a t t . This always holds in a linear tax system because in 
this case  . 0 ) 1 (
* < δ − t  But if the tax system becomes very progressive, so that given the 
marginal tax rate t the average tax rate  ( ) w a t t
a − ≡ 1  becomes lower and thereby  0 1
* > δ −
a t  
might be the case, individual effort eventually will fall. This case is also the more likely, the 
smaller the wage elasticity of labor demand and the average tax burden are. If we assume a 
labor share of 2/3, we have  3 = δ , and an average tax below 1/3 would suffice to let effort fall 



































A sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for individual effort to fall is  1 < δ t  since we have 
δ < δ
*  and  t ta < . These findings can be summarized in 
Proposition 3 (individual effort determination): A revenue-neutral increase in 
wage tax progression will decrease (increase) individual effort if (i) the wage 
elasticity of labor demand and/or (ii) the marginal tax rate are sufficiently low 
(high). A sufficient condition is  1 < δ t  ( 1 > δ t ). 
5.3  Revenue-neutral tax progression and employment 
Finally, we consider the employment effect. The total effect of changes in the tax parameters t 
and a and the negotiated wage on employment is  dw L da L dt L dL w a t + + = . Substituting the 
RHS of the tax-revenue neutrality for da and using 
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The first two terms cancel out since they cover the change in t and a that ceteris paribus 
would leave the average tax burden, and thus the net-of-tax wage, constant. Hence, we are left 
with two effects. As we have seen in section 5.2, the tax reform affects individual effort 
depending on the wage elasticity of labor demand and the size of tax parameters. If – as is 
likely - effort decreases, labor productivity falls and ceteris paribus employment. On the other 
hand, the wage-moderating effect increases labor demand for any given effort level. The total 
effect thus becomes ambiguous. From proposition 3 we can immediately infer 
Proposition 4 (rising employment): A sufficient, but not necessary, condition 




From proposition 4 follows immediately that starting from a linear tax system with  t t
a = , 
employment will definitely rise. This leads to 
Corollary 1 (rising employment): Introducing tax progression is good for 
employment when wages are negotiated and effort is determined individually. 
Although we have seen that different wage-setting motives reinforce tax policy effects on 
gross wages, this is not no longer true with respect to employment. With observable and 
verifiable effort, employment is always increasing when tax progression rises. When effort is 
unobservable and not verifiable, we find a countervailing effect via the adverse effect a rise in 
tax progression has on individual effort.   21
5.4  Revenue-neutral tax progression and output 
Effort and employment may go in opposite directions so that the output effect is a priori 
ambiguous. Substituting equation (7) in equation (6) shows that output is proportional to wL. 
The total effect of a revenue-neutral tax reform is then given by 
[] Ldw wdL eL df + − δ δ =
−1 ) 1 ( ) ( . Substituting in equation (25) thus yields for a revenue-





































If  t t
a ≥ δ
* , i.e.  1 ) 1 (
1 * ≥ − δ
− aw , output is increasing. This can be summarized in 
Proposition 5 (rising output): A sufficient, but not necessary, condition that a 




Proposition 5 implies that starting from a linear tax system with  t t
a = , output will also rise 
when tax progression is introduced so that we have 
Corollary 2 (rising output): Introducing tax progression raises output when 
wages are negotiated and effort is determined individually. 
5.5  Revenue-neutral tax progression and welfare 
Finally we want to briefly discuss the welfare implications. An appropriate measure of 
welfare in our framework is the sum of profits and workers’ surplus, i.e.  
(27) 
[ ]
[] [] bN L e g b wL bN L e g b eL f
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1
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where  wL e w eL eL f
1 1 1 1
) 1 (
1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
− − δ δ − − δ
− δ
− − δ δ = − δ δ = − δ δ = . In general the welfare 
effects are affected in different directions by the parameters that specify the production   22
technology and the disutilty from effort so that general unambiguous statements cannot be 
derived. However, the properties of the model allow us to derive at least some sufficient 
conditions for welfare to improve. 
First, note that the worker’s surplus s is increasing in effort. This follows from the 
worker’s optimal effort choice, i.e.  0 ) ( '
1 = − =
− e g e s de V
d d w
e , from which follows that 
) (
1 e g d s
− θ = . Hence, when worker chooses a higher level of individual effort they are always 
better off. Second, when employment rises those additional workers that find employment are 
better since  0 ) ( > − − b e g w
n . Thus no worker will lose when employment is rising. Finally, 
profit is increasing in output as profit is given by  ) ( ) 1 (
1 1 eL f wL
− − δ = − δ  Hence, a sufficient 
condition for a positive welfare effect is that the reform does not lead to a fall in effort, 
employment and output. A necessary condition for the first requirement to hold is  1
* ≥ δ
a t . A 
sufficient condition for the latter two requirements is  t t
a ≥ δ
* . Thus  1
* ≥ δ a t  suffices to fullfill 
all three requirements. This leads to our last proposition. 
Proposition 6 (rising welfare): Welfare is always increasing when a revenue-
neutral increase in wage tax progression will increase effort. 
Workers only increase effort when they are better off. Since for a revenue-neutral increase in 
tax progression, higher effort is always associated with higher employment and output, more 
workers benefit from the higher surplus per worker and profit increases as well. 
6. Conclusions 
We have provided an extended framework to study the implications of the imperfectly 
observable individual effort of workers on the negotiated wage and the impact of a revenue-
neutral change in the wage tax progression on wage negotiations, individual effort, 
employment, output and welfare. The first, and most important, result is that a higher degree 
of tax progression in this framework always leads to wage moderation. Our model confirms 
this result for the case of observable effort and wage bargaining as well as for the case where   23
firms set efficiency wages unilaterally: the different wage-setting motives reinforce partial tax 
policy effects present in each model. However, when effort is not observable and verifiable, 
the clear-cut effect well-known from the wage bargaining literature that tax progression is 
good for employment does not carry over to the case of imperfectly observable effort. In the 
general case, it remains true that introducing tax progression is good for employment, but if 
the adverse effect on effort becomes sufficiently large due to too high a degree of tax 
progression, we cannot rule out the case where employment falls as a consequence of a 
progressivity-enhancing tax reform. Since higher effort level are only observed when workers 
are better off by providing more effort, increasing effort indicates that welfare is 
unambiguously improving. Since in this case both profits and workers’ surplus increase, 
increasing effort as a consequence of a revenue-neutral increase in tac progression is even a 
sufficient condition for a strict Pareto improvement. 
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Appendix A: the negotiated wage 
This appendix develops the expressions for the terms 
* * π πw  and  U Uw  in the first-order 
condition (13) that determines the Nash bargaining solution. We start by looking at the profit 
response of the firm to a change in the wage rate. The indirect profit function was presented in 
equation (9). By applying the envelope theorem, according to which the effect which takes 
place through the labor demand vanishes at the optimum, we find that 
(A1) 
[]
[] , 0 1
) (
1 ) (
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from which it follows that  
(A2)  0










as  . 1 < ε  With respect to the trade union’s utility, we find that  
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Substituting (A4) and (A2) into (14) yields 
(A5)  [ ]
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Using the definition of the total wage elasticity of labor demand 
* δ , we obtain by making use 
of equations (2) and (3) 
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Using the explict functional form for effort yields for the disutility of effort 
[] b ta t w d d e g − + − θ + =
− ) 1 ( ) ( ) (
1 * . Substituting in (A8) yields 
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Rearranging yields 









ε − − δ − ta b
d d
t w  
which gives equation (14). 
Appendix B: the sign of the numerator of (22) 
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Appendix C: the Slutzky-decomposition for the total effect of the wage tax on the 
negotiated wage  
Differentiating the indirect Nash maximand 
0 1 * * Ω = π = Ω
β − β U , where 
* sL U =  and 
* * * * ) 1 ( ) ( L s w L e f + − = π , with respect to t and a gives 
(C1) (i)  0 ) (
* 1 * 1 1 * 1 * < − π β − = π β = Ω
β − − β β − − β a w L U U U t t , 
 (ii)  0
* 1 * 1 1 * 1 * > π β = π β = Ω
β − − β β − − β t L U U U a a . 
The wage tax has a negative effect and tax exemption has a positive effect on the Nash 
maximand. Using the comparative statics, the indirect Nash maximand can be inverted in 
terms of a for the function  ) , (
0 Ω = t h a . Substituting this for a in 
0 1 * * V U = π = Ω
β − β  gives 
the compensated indirect Nash maximand 
0 0 * )) , ( , ( Ω = Ω Ω t h t .
9 Differentiating this 
compensated indirect Nash maximand with respect to t gives  0
* * = Ω + Ω a t t h  so that 
t a w h a t t / ) ( /
* * − = Ω Ω − = . This describes the relationship of tax parameters to keep the Nash 
maximand constant. 
                                                 
9   See Diamond and Yaari (1972).   27
According to the duality theorem, the Nash maximand wage function w and the 
compensated wage function 
c w  at the same Nash maximand level are equal, so that we have 
) , ( )) , ( , (
0 0 Ω = Ω t w t h t w
c . Differentiating this with respect to the wage tax gives 
c








− = , 
where the total effect of the wage tax rate has been decomposed into the negative substitution 
effect ( 0 <
c
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